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Tammikuu 2019 
Tiivistelmä 
Ironian ymmärtämisen teorioiden mukaan ironisen lausahduksen merkityksen 
ratkaiseminen kestää pidempään kuin saman lausahduksen prosessointi kirjaimellisessa 
merkityksessä, mikäli lausahdus ei ole entuudestaan tuttu ja jos sitä ei ole voinut 
ennakoida. Tämän hidastumisen ajatellaan heijastavan virkkeen uuden merkityksen 
liittämistä aiempaan tekstikontekstiin, mikä edellyttää virkkeen uudelleen prosessointia. 
Muiden kuvaannollisen kielen muotojen, kuten metaforien, merkityksen ymmärtämisen 
on oletettu tapahtuvan samankaltaisen prosessin kautta. Lisäksi pitkään on oletettu, että 
terveet aikuiset ymmärtävät ironiaa samalla tavoin. Viimeaikaiset tutkimukset ovat 
osoittaneet, että eri kuvaannollisen kielen muotojen ymmärtäminen edellyttää lukijalta 
erilaisia kognitiivisia taitoja. Lisäksi viimeaikaiset tutkimustulokset antavat viitteitä 
siitä, että ironian ymmärtämisessä on yksilöllisiä eroja, jotka voisivat liittyä työmuistin 
kapasiteettiin ja emotionaalisen tiedon prosessointikykyyn. Tässä tutkielmassa halusin 
selvittää: 1) kuinka lukijat ratkaisevat ironisen lausahduksen merkityksen, 2) kuinka 
yksilölliset erot työmuistin kapasiteetissa ja emotionaalisen informaation 
prosessoinnissa vaikuttavat ironian prosessointiin ja 3) kuinka ironian prosessointi eroaa 
muiden kuvaannollisen kielen muotojen, kuten metaforien, prosessoinnista. Näitä 
tutkimuskysymyksiä selvitettiin neljässä osatutkimuksessa silmänliikemenetelmän 
avulla. Menetelmän avulla on mahdollista seurata reaaliajassa ymmärtämisprosessin 
etenemistä. Tutkielman tulokset osoittavat, että lukijat prosessoivat ironisen virkkeen 
uudelleen ymmärtääkseen sen tarkoitetun merkityksen. Työmuistin kapasiteetti auttaa 
tässä prosessissa joko auttamalla lukijoita pitämään mielessään konteksti-informaatiota, 
jotta he voivat integroida uuden merkityksen siihen, tai auttamalla lukijoita torjumaan 
ironisen lausahduksen kirjaimellisen merkityksen tulkintaprosessin aikana. 
Emotionaalisen informaation prosessointikyky auttaa lukijaa tunnistamaan ironisen 
kommentin emotionaalisen viestin; ne lukijat joiden emootioiden prosessointikyky on 
heikko, joutuvat tulkintaa tehdessään nojaamaan enemmän kontekstissa esitettyihin 
vihjeisiin. Tutkimuksen tulokset osoittavat myös, että ironian prosessointi eroaa 
metaforien prosessoinnista. Metaforat ovat helpompia ymmärtää ja niiden merkityksen 
prosessointi alkaa varhaisemmassa vaiheessa. Lisäksi emotionaalisen informaation 
prosessointikyky liittyy vain ironian prosessointiin. Tämän tutkielman löydöksiin 
perustuen esitän uuden teoreettisen viitekehyksen ironian ymmärtämiseen, 
kumuloituvien todisteiden mallin. 
Avainsanat: ironia, sarkasmi, metafora, kuvaannollinen kieli, silmänliikkeet, lukeminen, 
yksilölliset erot, emootio, työmuisti 
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Abstract 
Theoretical accounts of irony comprehension assume that when an ironic utterance is 
unfamiliar and the context does not prime for ironic interpretation, processing should 
take longer than when reading the same utterance with a literal meaning. This slowdown 
reflects problems in integrating the utterance into the developing text representation, 
which results in a reanalysis of the utterance. Similar assumptions are made about other 
forms of figurative language, such as metaphors, although studies have shown that there 
are differences in the cognitive demands of different forms of figurative language. Until 
fairly recently, most of the studies have ignored possible individual differences in irony 
comprehension among healthy adults. Recent results have suggested that there might be 
individual differences in irony comprehension related to working memory capacity 
(WMC) and emotion processing. In the present thesis, I wanted to answer the following 
questions: 1) How do readers resolve the meaning of irony? 2) How do individual 
differences in WMC and the ability to process emotional information affect the 
processing of irony? and 3) Does the processing of irony differ from the processing of 
other forms of figurative language, namely metaphors? These questions were examined 
in four studies using eye-tracking to tap into the detailed time-course of resolving the 
meaning of irony. The results of these studies showed that readers need to reprocess the 
ironic utterance to achieve the intended meaning, as suggested by the theories on irony 
comprehension. WMC aids this process by helping readers to keep contextual 
information in their mind while they integrate the meaning of the utterance with the 
context and/or inhibit a more salient literal interpretation while making the inference. 
Emotion processing abilities help to recognize the emotional cues of irony; readers with 
a poorer ability to process emotional information need to rely more on textual context to 
resolve the ironic meaning. Finally, resolving the ironic meaning differs from resolving 
other forms of figurative language, namely metaphors. Metaphors are easier to 
comprehend, and the processing of the intended meaning of metaphors starts at an earlier 
stage of reading. Moreover, emotion processing abilities are related to the processing of 
irony, but not metaphors. Based on the findings of this thesis, I present a new theoretical 
framework, the Cumulative Evidence Model. 
Keywords: irony, sarcasm, metaphor, figurative language, eye-tracking, reading, 
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Before going more deeply into the topic of this thesis, I find it important to define 
irony because it is used loosely in everyday language (e.g., Morissette & Ballard, 
1995). A short definition for irony is that it is “a result opposite to what was 
expected” (Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2017). Irony can be roughly divided into 
verbal and situational irony (Attardo, 2000; Kumon-Nakamura, Glucksberg, & 
Brown, 1995). Situational irony refers to a state of the world which is perceived as 
ironic; for example, when a fire station is on fire. Verbal irony, on the other hand, 
can be defined as the use of words to express something other than, and especially 
intending the opposite of, the literal meaning (Attardo, 2000; Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary, 2017). For example, when Peter’s friend Paul finds out that Peter did not 
donate any money for the new children’s hospital, and Paul utters, “You’re such a 
generous person.” What Paul means is to criticize Peter’s indifference. The present 
thesis concentrates only on the processing of verbal irony.  
 The above given dictionary definition on verbal irony is in line with so-called 
classical view on irony (e.g., Grice, 1975). In the research literature, it is argued that 
the classical view is too simple and does not capture all the forms of verbal irony 
(see e.g., Burgers, van Mulken, & Schellens, 2011; Gibbs & Colston, 2007; Wilson 
& Sperber, 2004). One more nuanced definition, trying to combine the other existing 
definitions, is that verbal irony is “an utterance with a literal evaluation that is 
implicitly contrasting the intended evaluation” (Burgers et al., 2011, p. 190). From 
the point of view of this thesis both of the definitions given above are able to 
discriminate the ironic materials from the non-ironic ones used across the studies of 
this thesis.   
 For the topic of this thesis it is also important to define sarcasm because 
sometimes verbal irony and sarcasm are seen as synonymous (Attardo, 2000; Gibbs 
& Colston, 2007; Haiman, 1998), even though the Roman rhetorician Quintilian had 
already differentiated between irony and sarcasm around 2,000 years ago 
(Quintilian, trans. 1921). In the present thesis, and often in the research literature, 
sarcasm is defined as a subtype of verbal irony, which differs from the other types 
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of irony in that sarcasm is used to criticize someone1 (Attardo, 2000; Haiman, 1998; 
Kreuz & Glucksberg, 1989). In other words, the essential difference between verbal 
irony and sarcasm is that sarcasm is aggressive, intentional, and it has a target 
(Attardo 2000; Haiman, 1998). The example above about Peter and Paul is also an 
example of sarcasm. 
 Verbal irony is an integral part of our everyday communication. It is used across 
cultures2 (Schwoebel, Dews, Winner, & Srinivas, 2000), occurring on a daily basis 
in our lives; for example, irony is used approximately eight times per hour in 
American television shows (Schwoebel et al., 2000). The use of verbal irony has 
been shown to serve a social role. People often use it to soften criticism and to remind 
each other that they belong to the same group (Colston, 1997; Dews, Kaplan, & 
Winner, 1995; Gibbs, 2000; Gibbs & Izett, 2005). It has been shown that about 8% 
of all language used in conversations between friends is ironic (Gibbs, 2000). Irony 
is also used as an argumentative tool, and it is used, for example, in political debates 
(Musolff, 2017; Nuolijärvi & Tiittula, 2011). It has been suggested that people use 
ironic language more in the written form of computer-mediated communication than 
in face-to-face conversations, although there is a higher risk of miscommunication 
(Hancock, 2004).  
 Although irony is an important element of human communication, there is 
variability among people’s irony comprehension. Thus, the use of irony in 
communication, for example, in written form on social media sites, can lead to 
unwanted and unexpected consequences. For example, in 2013, before her flight to 
Cape Town, Justine Sacco wrote on Twitter, “Going to Africa. Hope I don’t get 
AIDS. Just kidding. I’m white!” Her tweet was taken as an offensive racist comment, 
and she was eventually fired from her job because of it (Ronson, 2015). She stated 
afterwards that she did not mean her comment to be racist, or that white people were 
immune to AIDS; her intention was to make an ironic joke about Americans being 
unaware of the problems in third-world countries (Ronson, 2015). Because ironic 
language is at risk of being misunderstood, it has been suggested that it should not 
be used, for example, in court (Tribler, 2010), in advertisements (Pehlivan, Berthon, 
& Pitt, 2011), or in education (Wilkins, 1932).  
                                                     
1  There is also so-called positive sarcasm, or ironic praise, where someone states 
something negative although s/he is giving a compliment (see e.g., Clark & Gerrig, 
1984; Gibbs, 2000). For example, Peter donates a huge amount of money to charity, 
and his friend Paul utters to him, “You’re such a horrible person.” What Paul means is 
that he appreciates Peter’s gesture. It has been suggested that ironic praise is not used 
as often in everyday language as ironic criticism, making it a rarer form of irony (see 
e.g., Clark & Gerrig, 1984; Gibbs, 2000). Hence, it is left out of the scope of this thesis. 
2  Curiously, Haiman (1998) reports that Hua people, a group in the Eastern Highlands of 
Papua New Guinea, do not use sarcasm. 
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 Traditionally, it has been thought that only children and patients with 
neurological and/or psychiatric disorders have deficits in irony comprehension. 
Irony comprehension is a developing ability that starts when children are around 5–
6 years old (Climie & Pexman, 2008; Dews et al., 1996; Glenwright & Pexman, 
2010; Pexman, Glenwright, Krol, & James, 2010; see also Recchia, Howe, Ross, & 
Alexander, 2010), and irony appreciation develops until early adulthood (see e.g., 
Dews et al., 1996; Glenwright & Pexman, 2010). It has been shown that several 
neurological and psychiatric conditions are associated with deficits in irony 
comprehension, for example, brain lesions (e.g., Bohrn, Altmann, & Jacobs, 2012; 
McDonald, 1999; Rapp Muntschler, & Erb, 2012; Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer, & 
Aharon-Peretz, 2005), alcoholism (Amenta, Nöel, Verbanck, & Campanella, 2013), 
autism spectrum disorder (e.g., Happé, 1993), and schizophrenia (Mo, Su, Chan, & 
Liu, 2008). Because verbal irony comprehension declines with many disorders, it is 
also used as a diagnostic tool (see e.g., “The Metaphor and Sarcasm Scenario Test”, 
Adachi et al., 2004; “The Awareness of Social Inference Test”, McDonald, 
Flanagan, Rollins, & Kinch, 2006). However, recent experimental findings (Ivanko, 
Pexman, & Olineck, 2004) and theories on irony comprehension (e.g., Giora, 1999) 
have suggested that there are also individual differences in verbal irony 
comprehension among the healthy adult population. The topic remains still largely 
unexplored. Because deficits in irony comprehension can lead to vast consequences, 
and irony comprehension ability is used as a diagnostic aid, it is important to 
understand why there are individual differences in the processing of verbal irony 
even among the healthy adult population and what makes irony comprehension a 
challenge to human cognition. Thus, it is the topic of the present thesis. 
 Next, I will go through the most important theories of irony comprehension. After 
that, I will go through factors that might cause individual differences in irony 
comprehension, followed by a discussion on the differences and similarities between 
irony and metaphors. Finally, I will introduce the eye-tracking methodology used 
across the studies conducted for the present thesis, describe the studies and their 
results in more detail, and draw conclusions based on the results. 
1.1. Theories on Irony Comprehension 
Several theories explaining verbal irony comprehension, and figurative language 
comprehension in general, have been developed within the past five decades by 
researchers in different fields, including philosophy, linguistics, and psychology 
(e.g., pretense theory, Clark & Gerrig, 1984; relevance theory, Sperber & Wilson, 
1995; and implicit display theory, Utsumi, 2000; see also Gibbs & Colston, 2012, 
for a review). Next, I will go through the four most influential theories in 
13
 
chronological order: the standard pragmatic view, the direct access view, the graded 
salience view, and the parallel constraint satisfaction framework. 
1.1.1. The standard pragmatic view 
The standard pragmatic view (Grice, 1975; Searle, 1979) is the most famous 
theoretical model of figurative language comprehension. The view argues that the 
maxims of conversation are adapted to the comprehension of verbal irony and other 
forms of figurative language. These maxims include the expectations that the speaker 
should be informative, truthful, relevant, and clear in what s/he utters. According to 
Grice (1975), verbal irony violates the expectation of the speaker being truthful, or 
the maxim of quality. However, later analyses of the nature of verbal irony have 
shown that it can break all the maxims of conversation (Kaufer, 1981). According to 
the standard pragmatic view, when an utterance breaks the maxims of conversation, 
the intended meaning of the utterance is achieved via a three-step process. First, the 
utterance is processed as literal. Second, a discrepancy between the expected literal 
meaning of the utterance and the context in which it is presented is detected. Third, 
an alternative, ironic meaning of the utterance is considered (Grice, 1975; Searle, 
1979). Thus, according to this view, comprehension of verbal irony requires more 
complex processing than comprehension of literal language. As a result, the view 
predicts longer processing times for the same sentence presented in a context making 
it ironic rather than literal.  
 The standard pragmatic view has received experimental support (e.g., Filik & 
Moxey, 2010). For example, several recent eye-tracking studies examining the 
processing of ironic vs. literal utterances embedded in a story context have shown 
longer total reading times for ironic utterances than for literal ones (Au-Yeung, 
Kaakinen, Liversedge, & Benson, 2015; Filik, Leuthold, Wallington, & Page, 2014; 
Filik & Moxey, 2010). As predicted by the standard pragmatic view, the results show 
that resolving irony causes problems in integrating the utterance with the developing 
text representation, causing a reanalysis of the utterance.  
 A major problem of the standard pragmatic view, at least from the perspective of 
this thesis, is that it does not take into account individual differences. However, this 
is understandable from the historical point of view, as the original purpose of the 
model was to give a general philosophical account of how the intended ironic 
meaning, and figurative meaning in general, of an utterance is derived (Bach, 2006). 
1.1.2. The direct access view 
In the late 1970s, psychologists started to test the processing of figurative language 
experimentally (e.g., Ortony, Schallert, Reynolds, & Antos, 1978). Some studies 
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suggested that the comprehension of ironic and metaphorical utterances would not 
necessarily take any longer, or could be comprehended even faster, than their literal 
counterparts, when presented in an adequate context (Gibbs, 1986; Ortony et al., 
1978). These findings contrasted with the predictions made by the standard 
pragmatic view (Grice, 1975). Consequently, the direct access view was suggested 
as an alternative (see e.g., Gibbs, 1994a). The direct access view (Gibbs, 1994a) 
posits that verbal irony comprehension and production do not require special 
cognitive processes when compared to the comprehension of literal language. If the 
context in which a statement is presented supports an ironic interpretation, the 
intended meaning of an utterance may be comprehended as easily as the meaning of 
a literal utterance (Gibbs, 1994a). Thus, the processing time of an utterance presented 
in a context biasing towards an ironic interpretation is not necessarily any longer 
than the processing time of the same utterance in a literal context. However, when 
the context does not support direct access to the ironic meaning, readers should have 
difficulty in integrating the ironic utterance with the context, resulting in longer 
reading times for ironic utterances in comparison to times for literal ones (Gibbs & 
Colston, 2012).  
 In support of the direct access view, Gibbs (1986) reported that sarcastic 
statements were faster to read than their literal counterparts. Only when the sarcasm 
was positive, were sentences slower to process than their literal counterparts. 
However, the study has been criticized for comparing the processing times of 
different utterances (Giora, 1995). For example, the statement “You are such a good 
friend,” uttered when a friend had treated somebody unfairly, was compared to “You 
are a terrible friend” as its literal counterpart: thus, there was a potential of 
confounding the processing difficulty of the target statements used (Giora, 1995).  
 As for the individual differences, according to Gibbs and Colston (2012), various 
readers and text-related factors may influence the ease of comprehending verbal 
irony. For example, a reader’s working memory capacity (WMC) may play a role in 
how well irrelevant properties of an utterance, such as literal interpretation, are 
suppressed. Readers with a low WMC may thus have problems in inferring the 
intended ironic meaning. Moreover, the ability to infer the thoughts and emotions of 
another person (theory of mind) may also play a crucial role in how well a reader is 
capable of interpreting an utterance as ironic (Colston & Gibbs, 2002). When the 
reader is better able to recognize the intention behind an ironic comment, s/he does 
not necessarily need to engage in the additional processing that is sometimes 




1.1.3. The graded salience view 
Taking the direct access view further, the graded salience view proposed by Giora 
(1997, 2003) states that two distinct mechanisms affect the processing of verbal 
irony: salience of an utterance, and contextual information. The salience of an 
utterance is crucial for how quickly its meaning is accessed. According to this view, 
the most salient meaning of an utterance is available automatically regardless of the 
context. Salient ironic utterances are coded in the mental lexicon and should be 
highly accessible, for example, due to their familiarity (Giora, 2003). Typically, the 
literal meaning is salient, and it is accessed first. If the literal meaning does not fit 
into the context, an alternative interpretation is sought, resulting in longer processing 
times for ironic utterances in comparison to the times for literal ones (e.g., Bohrn et 
al., 2012; Giora & Fein, 1999). However, sometimes the ironic meaning is the most 
salient meaning, as with familiar ironies such as “big deal!” and “tell me about it!” 
(Giora, 2003), and the ironic meaning is accessed first. Consequently, the literal 
interpretation is not necessarily processed at all. According to the graded salience 
view, familiar ironies should thus be processed as quickly as, or even faster than, 
their literal counterparts (Giora, 1997, 2003). Context also plays a role: Contextual 
information can increase the predictability of irony and thus facilitate the 
comprehension of ironic utterances (Giora, 2003). Moreover, it should be noted that 
graded salience view has been superseded by the defaultness hypothesis. It differs 
from the graded salience view by introducing predictions of superiority of default 
non-literal interpretations, i.e. superiority of default sarcastic criticism over non-
default positive sarcasm (Giora, Givoni, & Fein, 2015; see also Giora & Filik, 2018). 
 The graded salience view has received experimental support (Filik et al., 2014; 
Giora & Fein 1999). For example, Giora and Fein (1999) used the probe reaction 
time paradigm to study the activation of literal and ironic interpretation after reading 
a target sentence embedded in a story context. The target sentences included either 
familiar or unfamiliar ironies. They found that the salient (familiar) meaning was 
always activated first, supporting the notion that salient meanings are activated 
automatically. As for the processing times, Filik and colleagues (2014) studied the 
processing of ironic and literal utterances embedded in a story context using eye-
tracking. They found no difference in reading times between familiar ironies and 
their non-ironic counterparts, whereas reading times for unfamiliar ironic utterances 
were longer in comparison to those for their non-ironic counterparts (Filik et al., 
2014).  
 As for individual differences, the ability to inhibit or suppress the context-
irrelevant meaning of an utterance may be related to verbal irony comprehension 
(Giora, 1999). For example, readers who have a low WMC may have difficulties in 
suppressing the salient literal meaning when the non-salient ironic meaning is 
intended, and consequently, have trouble constructing an ironic interpretation. 
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1.1.4. The parallel constraint satisfaction framework 
Theories presented above have been criticized for explaining only a piece of the 
puzzle of verbal irony comprehension (see e.g., Gibbs & Colston, 2012; Pexman, 
2008). A recent theoretical view, the parallel constraint satisfaction framework, tries 
to bring the different views together (Pexman, 2008). The framework states that 
readers make use of various linguistic (e.g., contextual information and familiarity) 
and non-linguistic cues (e.g., tone of voice, reader-related factors) to resolve the 
meaning of an utterance (Pexman, 2008; see also Katz, 2005; Katz & Ferretti, 2001). 
These cues are activated by the ironic utterance and are considered in parallel 
(Pexman, 2008). If the activated cues support an ironic interpretation, the other 
interpretation options (often literal) become inhibited. Moreover, if there are cues 
about forthcoming irony, the ironic utterance is comprehended more quickly than if 
there are no cues about the possible use of irony. Similarly, if the cues strongly 
support a literal meaning, a literal utterance is comprehended more quickly than an 
ironic utterance. The framework assumes that reader-related factors, such as how 
much a person uses irony (Ivanko et al., 2004), influence the processing of ironic 
statements by shaping the likelihood that different interpretations are active in the 
reader’s mind.  
 The constraint satisfaction framework has received experimental support (Ivanko 
et al., 2004; Katz & Pexman, 1997; Pexman & Olineck, 2002). For example, it has 
been shown that if the person uttering the ironic comment belongs to a profession 
that is expected to be ironic (e.g., comedians), the profession works as a cue about 
ironic intent (Katz & Pexman, 1997; Pexman & Olineck, 2002). Ivanko and 
colleagues (2004) showed that a person’s own likelihood for using sarcastic irony 
speeded up the processing of sarcastic utterances.  
 The problem with the parallel constraint satisfaction framework is that it does not 
specify the exact processes that are required for comprehending an ironic utterance; 
rather, it serves as a framework for understanding how individuals interact with 
multiple cues to resolve the ironic meaning of an utterance. 
1.2. Individual Differences in Processing Irony 
Previous research has suggested that the processing of verbal irony is more 
cognitively demanding than the processing of literal language (see e.g., McDonald, 
1999). It is thought that individuals’ own cognitive capacity serves as a constraint on 
their ability to comprehend and process (linguistic) information (e.g., the capacity 
theory of comprehension; Just & Carpenter, 1992). As a cognitively more demanding 
form of language, irony should create more demands on the readers’ cognitive 




 Most of the studies that have found individual differences have studied children 
(e.g., Nicholson, Whalen, & Pexman, 2013) or clinical populations (e.g., McDonald, 
1999). However, some recent studies have shown that there are also individual 
differences among the healthy adult population (Ivanko et al., 2004). These 
differences have been shown to be related to an individual’s own use of verbal irony 
(e.g., Ivanko et al., 2004). Higher self-evaluated use of ironic language is related to 
faster processing of ironic sentences.  
 The main objective of the present thesis is to study how individual differences in 
the different cognitive and emotional abilities3, namely WMC and the ability to 
process emotional information, affect the processing of verbal irony among the 
healthy adult population. 
1.2.1. Working memory capacity 
Working memory can be defined as a system, or systems, of stores for temporarily 
maintaining information and as a supervisory or executive attentional mechanism 
(Baddley, 2010, Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Engle, 2010; Just & Carpenter, 1992). 
In other words, working memory is not only a passive storage system, a short-term 
memory store, but also a system responsible for coordinating information processing 
(e.g., Baddley & Hitch, 1974). There are individual differences in the capacities of 
working memory (e.g., Daneman & Carpenter, 1980), and it is relatively widely 
accepted that these differences are related to the ability to control attentional 
resources so that relevant information is quickly activated and irrelevant information 
is inhibited (e.g., Engle, 2010, see also Gernsbacher, 1993). For irony 
comprehension, the reader would need to inhibit, for example, contextual 
information that is irrelevant to the interpretation. It has also been suggested that 
readers with a low WMC would have problems with inhibiting the salient (typically 
literal) meaning (Giora, 1999; see also Miyake, Just, & Carpenter, 1994). 
Consequently, difficulties with inhibiting the literal meaning would cause difficulties 
with integrating the ironic interpretation of the utterance with the context. 
 Only a few clinical studies tap into the relation between WMC and the processing 
of verbal irony (e.g., Martin & McDonald, 2005; Monetta, Grindrod, & Pell, 2009). 
These studies have failed to show a direct relation between working memory and 
irony comprehension. For example, Martin and McDonald (2005) studied factors 
behind deficits in irony comprehension among traumatic brain injury patients, and 
they failed to show a correlation between working memory and irony 
comprehension. They suggest that the failure to find a correlation may be related to 
the working-memory task of their choice, rather than a non-existent correlation 
                                                     
3  It should be noted that cognitive and emotional functions are not necessarily separate 
from each other (see e.g., Pessoa, 2008). 
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between working memory and irony comprehension. They used the digit span task 
that measures only the storage component of working memory and does not tap into 
the inhibition component as the complex span tasks do (i.e., reading span task; 
Daneman & Carpenter, 1980). Monetta and colleagues (2005) studied verbal irony 
comprehension among Parkinson’s patients. They did not find a correlation between 
working memory and irony comprehension either; however, they did find a 
correlation between working memory and an ability to attribute the mental states of 
others. They argued that working memory might still play a role in irony 
comprehension because the ability to attribute the mental states of others, which is 
needed in pragmatic reasoning, depends crucially on the ability to manipulate 
information in the working memory. Thus, the relation between working memory 
and irony comprehension might be indirect. 
 Although current clinical studies do not lend support to the notion that WMC 
would play a role in irony comprehension, it is noteworthy that 1) clinical findings 
might not provide a reliable picture of how working memory affects the processing 
of irony in the healthy adult population, and 2) the measures used have not been 
optimal to tap into the individual differences in WMC (Martin & McDonald, 2005). 
As the research literature shows, WMC plays a prominent role in reading 
comprehension (e.g., Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Just & Carpenter, 1992), and 
there are well-reasoned theoretical suggestions that working memory would play a 
role also in irony comprehension (Giora, 1999). Hence, the present thesis explores 
the role of WMC in written irony comprehension. 
 Furthermore, there is an ongoing theoretical debate on whether the individual 
differences in WMC are domain-specific or domain-general (see e.g., Baddley, 
2010; Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Fougnie, Zughi, Godwin, & Marois, 2015; Kane 
et al., 2004; Oswald, McAbee, Redick, & Hambrick, 2014). The domain-specific 
view posits that a specific working memory task is related to outcomes relevant to 
that specific ability. For example, a reading-related working memory task, such as 
the reading span task, for which you need to recall the final words of sentences 
(Daneman & Carpenter, 1980), is related to linguistic abilities. In contrast, the 
domain-general view posits that task requirements are common across working 
memory tasks, and all working memory tasks reflect attentional control (e.g., Kane 
et al., 2004).  
 In the present thesis, the reading span task (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980) is 
primarily used because both views would assume it to be related to the processing of 
written irony. However, it is also possible that the visuospatial working memory 
might have a role in the processing of written irony. Obviously, the domain-general 
view assumes that the symmetry span task (Redick et al., 2012) used to measure 
visuospatial working memory would capture the same variance as the reading span 
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task, and the high scores would indicate a better overall ability to allocate attentional 
resources.  
 Previous studies show that readers build a spatial representation of the text while 
reading (see e.g., Baccino & Pynte, 1994; 1998; Kennedy, Brooks, Flynn, & Prophet, 
2003; Murray & Kennedy, 1988). The spatial representation allows readers to carry 
out selective re-inspections of the text, which is more efficient than just reading the 
whole text again (Kennedy et al., 2003). Re-inspections made during the course of 
reading, or regressive eye movements, have been shown to be related to resolving 
ambiguities in a text (e.g., Frazier & Rayner, 1982; Meseguer, Carreiras, & Clifton, 
2002; Mitchell, Shen, Green, & Hodgson, 2008) and to reading comprehension (e.g., 
Booth & Weger, 2013; Hyönä, Lorch, & Kaakinen, 2002; Hyönä & Nurminen, 2006; 
Rayner, Chace, Slattery, & Ashby, 2006; Schotter, Tran, & Rayner, 2014; White, 
Lantz, & Paterson, 2016). It has been suggested that returns to text during the course 
of reading do not necessarily indicate a need to re-examine the information itself, 
but a need to focus attention on what had appeared there (Meseguer et al., 2002). 
Moreover, it has been shown that the re-activation of a memory representation 
sometimes drives the eyes to an already-viewed location, and this enhances 
subsequent memory retrieval (Ferreira, Apel, & Henderson, 2008). According to 
some theories of irony comprehension, an ironic utterance is first processed as literal 
(at least under specific circumstances), and after the discrepancy between the literal 
and intended meaning is detected, a new meaning is determined for the utterance 
(e.g., Grice, 1975). This process presumably requires re-processing of the ironic 
statement and the text context, and some recent eye-tracking findings suggest that 
this might indeed be the case (e.g., Filik & Moxey, 2010). It is possible that 
visuospatial working memory might play a role in regressive eye movements that 
occur when attaching the new meaning to the statement. Thus, it is possible also from 
the domain-specific point of view that, at least to some extent, the visuospatial 
working memory might also play a role in reading comprehension, and it would be 
specifically related to the reprocessing of ironic statements.  
1.2.2. The ability to process emotional information 
Verbal irony serves a social function that is not achieved by speaking directly, so it 
conveys an emotional message that differs from the meaning of the literal 
interpretation (see e.g., Akimoto et al., 2014). For example, an ironic speaker 
typically intends to convey a negative attitude, especially while using sarcastic irony, 
and thus, ironic comments might be perceived as insulting (Akimoto et al, 2014; 
Bowes & Katz, 2011; Gibbs & Izett, 2005; Leggitt & Gibbs, 2000; Winner & 
Leekam, 1991). Irony might also be used as a form of humor, and thus, ironic 
statements may be perceived as funny (Akimoto et al, 2014; Dews et al, 1995; 
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Jorgensen, 1996; Kreuz, Long, & Church, 1991). The parallel constraint satisfaction 
framework suggests that inferring the intended emotional message delivered by the 
ironic statement works as a supporting cue for ironic interpretation, which should 
make processing of the ironic meaning easier or faster (Pexman, 2008). This 
suggestion is in line with more general findings showing that emotional content 
facilitates word processing, resulting in faster processing times in comparison to the 
processing of neutral words (see e.g., Kaakinen et al., 2018, for a review).  
 Recent studies have shown that emotional processing is related to irony 
comprehension (Amenta et al., 2013; Jacob, Kreifelts, Nizielski, Schütz, & 
Wildgruber, 2016; Nicholson et al., 2013; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2005; Shany-Ur et 
al., 2012). Jacob and colleagues (2016) used short videos to examine whether a 
mismatch between verbal and nonverbal information is perceived as irony, and 
whether emotional intelligence is related to how easily incongruent materials are 
categorized as ironic. Their results showed that incongruence between verbal and 
nonverbal cues was indeed related to the impression of irony, and participants 
scoring high in the emotional intelligence questionnaire were faster in categorizing 
slightly incongruent materials as ironic in comparison to those scoring low in 
emotional intelligence. Moreover, previous clinical studies and studies on children 
have demonstrated that the ability to process emotional information plays a seminal 
role in irony comprehension (Amenta et al., 2013; Nicholson et al., 2013; Shamay-
Tsoory et al., 2005; Shany-Ur et al., 2012). For example, Shany-Ur and colleagues 
(2012) showed that patients with neurodegenerative diseases failed at complex 
social-cognitive tasks, such as emotion reading, leading them to misinterpret 
sarcastic irony. Moreover, the presence of good empathy skills in children has been 
shown to be related to better judgment of a speaker’s intent as well as better 
comprehension of irony (Nicholson et al., 2013). 
 However, the questions of whether the ability to process emotional information 
affects the processing of written irony or of irony comprehension among the healthy 
adult population still remains unanswered. Consequently, these questions were 
explored in the present thesis. 
 In previous studies, a variety of tasks and methodologies has been used to study 
emotion processing abilities and their relation to experiencing, processing, or 
comprehending verbal irony. In the present thesis, two different tasks were used to 
measure individual differences related to the ability to process emotional 
information: Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 
1994) and 20-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS; Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 
1994; Joukamaa et al., 2001). The selection of tasks was influenced by their 
relevance to irony comprehension and by being able to reliably use them in Finnish, 
the language studied in the present thesis. 
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 IGT is thought to measure an individual’s sensitivity to emotional responses to 
reward and/or punishment in a decision-making task, and this emotional response is 
thought to be, at least to some extent, unconscious (e.g., Buelow & Suhr, 2009). It is 
developed as a neuropsychological tool to detect patients with lesions on the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex, who have deficits in employing emotional 
information in decision-making. Ventromedial lesions have been shown to be related 
to deficits in sarcasm comprehension (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2005). Moreover, 
prefrontal areas in general have been shown to be active during irony comprehension 
(e.g., Akimoto et al., 2014; Uchiyama et al., 2006). IGT is sensitive enough to also 
capture variance among a healthy population (e.g., Suhr & Tsanadis, 2007). Thus, 
IGT should capture emotional responses relevant to irony comprehension, and it 
should be related to the immediate emotional response evoked after the reader has 
processed an ironic statement and starts to build an inference. 
 TAS, on the other hand, measures individuals’ ability to recognize and name 
emotions (i.e., alexithymic traits).  In contrast to IGT, TAS should reflect a more 
conscious emotional processing ability. In terms of verbal irony comprehension, 
TAS should be related to readers’ ability to name and recognize the protagonist’s 
intention to insult another person, and this should help in inferring the meaning of 
the statement. TAS has been used before, at least in one clinical study, to explore 
relation between alexithymic traits and irony comprehension (Dimaggio et al., 2011). 
In their study, Dimaggio and colleagues (2011) explored among psychiatric patients 
the relationship between alexithymic traits (as measured with TAS) and 
comprehension of ironic jokes in cartoons. Their results showed that an increase in 
alexithymic traits was related to slower categorization of jokes as ironic. Moreover, 
TAS has also been shown to be sensitive enough to capture variance in the ability to 
recognize and name emotions among a healthy population (e.g., Luminent, 
Vermeulen, Demaret, Taylor, & Bagby, 2006), which is why it is used in the present 
study. 
1.3. Verbal Irony and Metaphors 
Metaphor can be defined as “a figure of speech comparing two unlike things without 
using ‘like’ or ‘as’” (Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2017). Most of the metaphors 
appear in the form A is B (Gibbs, 1994b); for example, marriage is a roller coaster 
ride. A metaphor is constructed from its parts A and B, which are referred to as topic 
and vehicle, respectively (Glucksberg, 2001). To comprehend the metaphor in the 
example, you need to know what qualities marriages (topic) and roller coaster rides 
(vehicle) carry and what qualities of the vehicle are relevant from the topic’s 
perspective (Glucksberg, 2001); for example, that both contain ups and downs.  
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 Traditionally, it was thought that for different forms of figurative language, such 
as irony and metaphors, the intended meaning would be achieved via a similar 
process (Grice, 1975). Irony and metaphors break the same rule of communication, 
the maxim of quality, or the expectation of the speaker being truthful (Grice, 1975). 
In contrast to this traditional view, for the following reasons, it has been suggested 
that irony and metaphors should be different in respect of their structure, function, 
and comprehension demands (Winner & Gardner, 1993). First, metaphors express 
similarities between the topic and the vehicle, whereas irony creates a contrast 
between what is said and what is implied. Second, irony delivers the speaker’s 
opinion about the topic, whereas metaphors describe the topic. Third, metaphors and 
irony pose different cognitive demands: To comprehend a metaphor, a reader should 
have sufficient prior knowledge, for example, about marriages and rollercoasters. On 
the other hand, successful comprehension of irony requires that the reader is sensitive 
to the emotional state of the speaker and can infer the meaning from what is actually 
being said (Akimoto et al., 2014).  
 Previous research has given support to the notion that metaphors and irony are 
indeed processed differently (Colston & Gibbs, 2002; Pexman, Ferretti, & Katz, 
2000). Ironic sentences have been shown to be slower to read than metaphorical 
sentences (Colston & Gibbs, 2002). Moreover, metaphorical ironies have been 
shown to be slower to read than ironic sentences (Colston & Gibbs, 2002) and 
metaphors (Pexman et al., 2000). Brain imaging studies also support these findings 
by showing that irony and metaphors activate different areas in the brain (Bohrn et 
al., 2012; Rapp et al., 2012). 
 One of the aims of the present thesis was to examine whether the processing of 
verbal irony differs from that of the other forms of figurative language, namely 
metaphors, in contrast to the traditional view (Grice, 1975). Moreover, the purpose 
of the present thesis was to examine to what extent individual differences in the 
processing of irony and metaphors arise from specific cognitive demands related to 
the type of figurative language, as suggested by the former research literature (e.g., 
Colston & Gibbs, 2002; Winner & Gardner, 1993). 
1.4. Eye-Tracking Methodology 
Most of the studies on the processing of written irony have used the probe reaction 
time methodology (e.g., Giora, Fein, & Schwartz, 1998) or the moving window 
paradigm, in which readers are shown the text one word at a time (e.g., Ivanko et al., 
2000; Pexman et al., 2000). These methodologies allow for only one processing time 
measurement (e.g., first-pass reading time for each word in an ironic utterance), 
without the possibility of examining for variation in the processing (e.g., rereading 
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of the ironic statement). These methodologies also disturb normal reading (see e.g., 
Rayner 1998 for review).  
 Eye-tracking was used across all four studies on which this thesis is based. Using 
eye-tracking methodology, it is possible to tap into the moment-to-moment cognitive 
processing during reading (Rayner, 1998; 2009). Thus, it is an excellent method for 
resolving the detailed time-course for processing written language, and, especially 
relevant to this thesis, for the processing of written irony. Eye-tracking is a relatively 
unobtrusive method that allows normal reading, and it gives moment-to-moment 
data for the progress of reading. The present dissertation project is one of the first to 
use eye-tracking to study the processing of verbal irony (the first study being that of 
Filik & Moxey, 2010). However, during the course of this project, several new 
studies using eye-tracking methodology emerged (e.g., Au-Yeung et al., 2015; Filik, 
Brightman, Gathercole, & Leuthold, 2017; Filik et al., 2014; Filik & Moxey, 2010; 
Turcan & Filik, 2016). These served to prove the usefulness of the methodology in 
studying the processing of ironic language. 
 Eye-tracking has been used to study reading for decades. Technical development 
of eye-tracking systems has progressed relatively quickly since the mid-1970s, 
resulting in an extensive amount of literature on cognitive processes underlying 
reading as reflected in eye-movements (Rayner, 1998; 2009). Most of the studies 
thus far have been focused on the processing of single words and how the qualities 
of a word (such as word frequency) and its meaning in the sentence (e.g., whether or 
not it is ambiguous) affect the processing times. Within the last decade or so, an 
increasing number of experiments have been concentrating on global text processing 
(i.e., the processing of texts longer than one or two sentences; see e.g., Jarodzka & 
Brand-Gruwel, 2017). These sentence-level analyses are particularly informative 
when the “area of interest” is not a single word (cf. Rayner, 1998), but consists of a 
phrase or a sentence (Hyönä, Lorch, & Rinck, 2003), which is often the case with 
ironic statements. This approach was deemed more suitable for studying the 
processing of verbal irony because a single word can rarely be counted as ironic and 
thus is a sentence-level phenomenon. Consequently, across all four studies for this 
thesis, sentence-level measures were computed from the eye-movement data (see 
Hyönä et al., 2003). However, in Study III, some of the measures used were different 
from those used in the other studies of this thesis. The measures used across the 
experiments are presented in Table 1.  
 Eye fixations can be categorized into fixations done during the first-pass reading 
of a sentence and to later look-backs that are initiated from subsequent parts of text. 
First-pass sentence reading can be further divided into forward-fixations that land on 
unread parts of the sentence, and to first-pass rereadings, which are fixations that 
return to earlier parts of the sentence (Liversedge, Paterson, & Pickering, 1998). If 
effects are found in first-pass reading, the effect is thought to reflect immediate 
24
 
difficulty in processing that text region (Liversedge et al., 1998). Forward-fixation 
time consists of gaze durations on consecutive words that were read in a progressive 
manner, thus reflecting the efficiency of word recognition in sentence context 
(Rayner, 1998; 2009). On the other hand, first-pass rereading is thought to reflect 
comprehension difficulty (Hyönä et al., 2003; Liversedge et al., 1998). Regression-
path duration is typically reported in studies examining processing of specific target 
words embedded in a sentence, and it is thought to reflect difficulty in processing the 
critical text region (Liversedge et al., 1998).  
 
Table 1 
Descriptions of the Eye Movement Measures Used Across the Studies of this Thesis 
Measure Description Studies used in 
First-pass reading time Summed duration of fixations 
made on one sentence before 
moving to the next. 
I, II, III, IV 
 
Forward-fixation time Summed duration of fixations 
that land on unread parts of the 
sentence during first-pass 
reading.  
I, II, IV 
 
First-pass rereading time  Summed duration of fixations 
that were made during the re-
inspection of the sentence before 
moving to the next. 
I, II, IV 
 Regression path duration Summed duration of the 
fixations that occurred from the 
first fixation in a sentence until 
the participant moved his/her 
eyes beyond the sentence to the 
right. 
III 
Look-back fixation time  Summed duration of fixations 
returning to the sentence from 
other parts of the text after the 
first-pass reading. 
I, II, III, IV 
Look-from fixation time Summed duration of look-back 
fixations that were initiated from 
the sentence. 
I, II, IV 
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 Look-back measures, look-back fixation time and look-from fixation time, are 
thought to reflect a conscious effort (Hyönä & Nurminen, 2006) to build a 
comprehensive mental representation of the text contents (Hyönä et al., 2002). 
Readers are able, at least to some extent, to report after reading whether they looked 
back in the text, and if they did, where (Hyönä & Nurminen, 2006). Moreover, 
readers who initiate look-backs to important parts of the text gain better 
comprehension than readers who look back more randomly (e.g., Hyönä et al., 2002). 
1.5. Aims and Hypotheses 
The aim of the present thesis was to answer the following questions: 1) How do 
readers resolve the meaning of irony? 2) How do individual differences in WMC and 
the ability to process emotional information affect the processing of irony? and 3) 
Does the processing of irony differ from the processing of other forms of figurative 
language, namely metaphors? These questions were examined across four studies 
using eye-tracking to tap into the detailed time-course of resolving the meaning of 
irony.  
 
Four hypotheses emerged from the previous research literature:  
1)  Written ironic statements should take more time to process when the ironic 
utterance itself is not familiar and when there are no advanced cues for 
forthcoming irony.  
2)  WMC relates to a better ability to inhibit irrelevant and more salient literal 
meaning; thus, high WMC readers should show faster/earlier processing of 
ironic utterances.  
3)  Emotional components in the processing of irony should serve as cues 
pointing towards ironic interpretation and should facilitate the processing of 
verbal irony. Thus, those who have a better ability to process emotional 
information should show faster processing of ironic meaning.  
4)  Ironic statements should be harder to process than metaphorical statements, 
resulting in faster/earlier processing of metaphorical statements than the 
processing of ironic ones. Moreover, individual differences in general 
cognitive factors, such as WMC, should be related to the processing of both 
metaphors and irony, whereas the efficiency of emotional processing should 








2. Overview of the Studies 
 
Study I 
Kaakinen, J. K., Olkoniemi, H., Kinnari, T., & Hyönä, J. (2014). Processing of 
written irony: An eye movement study. Discourse Processes, 51, 287–311. 
 
Study I consisted of two experiments. Experiment 1 explored the processing of 
verbal irony, while Experiment 2 explored individual differences in the processing 
of verbal irony related to WMC, self-reported use of sarcasm, and cognitive style. 
Across the experiments, participants read target utterances embedded either in an 
ironic or non-ironic story context while their eye movements were recorded (Exp. 1, 
N = 52, Exp. 2, N = 60). Some of the texts were translated and modified versions of 
the texts used by Weingartner and Klin (2005), and other experimental and filler 
texts were written for the purpose of this study (24 experimental texts and 6 fillers). 
The texts were slightly modified for Experiment 2 so that all the ironic utterances 
contained sarcastic irony, and the number of filler items was increased (24 
experimental texts, and 12 fillers). An example text is presented in Table 2. After 
reading each story, participants responded to a text memory question and an 
inference question that tapped into the understanding of the meaning of the target 
utterance. The percentage of correct answers was calculated for both text memory 
and inference questions. 
 In Experiment 2, individual differences related to WMC were measured using the 
reading span task (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980), usage of sarcastic language was 
measured using the Sarcasm Self-Report Scale (SSS; Ivanko et al., 2004), and 
cognitive style was measured using the Need for Cognition Scale (NFC; Caccioppo, 
Petty, & Kao, 1984). 
 The results of Experiment 1 showed that readers were more likely to reread ironic 
than non-ironic target sentences during the first-pass reading as well as during later 
look-backs. Moreover, readers were poorer at answering inference questions 
concerning ironic rather than literal target utterances.  
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 The results of Experiment 2 showed that WMC, but not SSS or NFC, played a 
role in how readers resolved the meaning of ironic sentences. High WMC was related 
to the increased probability of initiating first-pass rereading of ironic sentences 
compared to the rereading of literal sentences. Moreover, readers were poorer at 
answering inference questions concerning ironic utterances than they were at 






Example of an Experimental Text Used in Study I 
Text Segment Text Type Text 
Pre-context 
 
An old action movie sequel was recently 
released in the movie theaters. Eemil was 
really excited about this because he had 
really loved the original movie. He asked his 
friend Ville to join him in watching the 
movie. “It’s going to be the best movie ever,” 
Eemil praised the movie to Ville. Ville 
agreed, and they met in the evening at the 
movie theater. 
Critical context Literal The movie was a great sequel to the original 
movie. New special effects made the film 
really impressive.  
Sarcastic The movie was a dull copy of the original. 
Even the jokes were the same. 
Target phrase 
 
“That was definitely the best movie ever.” 
Spillover region 
 
Ville said after the movie, grinning. 
Paragraph end  
 
The boys decided to have something to eat 
before going home. 
Text memory question 
 
Were Eemil and Ville at a concert? 
Inference question   Did the boys like the movie? 
Note: Example given is a translation from Finnish. 
 
 The results suggest that the processing of irony requires extra effort and that the 
effects are localized in the ironic sentence. The result is in line with those theories 
that assume that the processing of an ironic phrase that is not familiar and is not 
supported by the story context should be slower than its literal counterpart (Gibbs, 
1994a; Giora, 2003; Grice, 1975; Pexman, 2008), as was the case in this experiment. 
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However, the results showed that despite the extra processing effort, readers were 
not always able to resolve the meaning of irony. Moreover, the results suggest that a 
high WMC facilitates the recognition of an utterance as ironic by helping the reader 
to either maintain or activate alternative interpretations for the utterance. To 
conclude, the results showed that there are individual differences in the processing 
of verbal irony related to WMC. These findings confirm that a reader’s cognitive 
abilities matter in the processing of ironic utterance.  
Study II 
Olkoniemi, H., Ranta, H., & Kaakinen, J. K. (2016). Individual differences in the 
processing of written sarcasm and metaphor: Evidence from eye movements. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 42, 433–
450. 
 
In Study 2, differences between the processing of two forms of figurative language, 
sarcastic irony and metaphor, were examined. Previous research literature has 
suggested that the comprehension of sarcastic irony and metaphor create different 
cognitive demands for the reader (Colston & Gibbs, 2002; Pexman et al., 2000). 
Specifically, it has been suggested that comprehending metaphors requires 
knowledge about the qualities of both the topic and the vehicle, and an ability to 
connect the two. On the other hand, successful comprehension of sarcasm requires 
the reader to be sensitive to the emotional state of the speaker and to able to infer the 
intended meaning of the statement (Akimoto et al., 2014). Thus, different reader-
related characteristics should be related to the processing of metaphors and sarcasm. 
It was expected that individual differences in general cognitive factors, such as 
working memory and cognitive processing styles, would be related to the processing 
of both types of figurative language, whereas individual differences in the efficiency 
of emotional processing would be specific to the processing of sarcasm. Thus, Study 
II explored whether the processing of sarcastic irony and metaphors relies on general 
cognitive constraints (WMC and NFC) or whether it poses specific cognitive 
demands. 
 In the study, 60 participants read ironic, metaphorical, and literal sentences 
embedded in story contexts (each participant read a total of 30 stories) while their 
eye movements were recorded, and they responded to a text memory and an 
inference question after each story. The percentage of correct answers was calculated 
for both text memory and inference questions. An example story is presented in 
Table 3. Experimental stories were pre-tested for the familiarity of the utterances as 
literal, metaphoric, and ironic in meaning; how natural each type of utterance was in 
the story context; whether the emotional state of the speaker was apparent in the 
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ironic statement; and whether the context supported a figurative interpretation. All 
figurative utterances were rated as unfamiliar; literal, metaphoric, and ironic target 
utterances were evaluated to be natural in the story context; ironic utterances were 
evaluated to be less positive and more negative than their metaphoric and literal 
counterparts; and the story contexts did not provide cues about figurative 
interpretation for the utterance.  
 Individual differences in WMC were measured using the reading span task 
(Daneman & Carpenter, 1980), the cognitive style of the reader was measured using 
the NFC (Caccioppo et al., 1984), and the ability to process emotions was measured 
using the IGT (Bechara et al., 1994). 
 The results revealed differences in the processing patterns for irony and 
metaphors, as well as individual differences in how readers processed these types of 
figurative language. The processing of metaphors was characterized by a slowdown 
during the first-pass reading of the utterances, suggesting that readers are sensitive 
to the metaphors and are able to start processing the meaning of them on the spot. 
Moreover, the results showed that there are individual differences related to general 
cognitive factors (WMC and NFC) in the processing of metaphors. Readers with low 
WMC tended to look back to metaphorical sentences and seemed to need extra time 
to process metaphors. It might be that low WMC readers may have trouble in 
suppressing salient literal meaning and thus need to look back to the metaphorical 
target sentence in order to refresh it in working memory so that the metaphorical 
interpretation can be validated (see e.g., Giora, 1999). 
 A higher NFC score was related to more time spent on rereading metaphors. To 
comprehend the meaning of a metaphor, the reader needs to retrieve conceptual 
information from his/her world knowledge (see e.g., Glucksberg, 2001). It has been 
shown that high NFC individuals are motivated to carry out tasks that require 
reasoning (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996). One possible explanation is 
that metaphor processing offers high NFC readers a challenge that draws their 
attention towards the metaphorical utterance. The ability to process emotional 
information was not related to the processing of metaphors.  
 The processing of irony was characterized by the increased probability of first-
pass rereading and of looking back at the text. Ironic utterances were also harder to 
comprehend than literal or metaphorical utterances, as indicated by a poorer 
performance in inference questions; this replicated the findings of Study I. These 
findings imply that the processing of irony is characterized by extra integrative 
processing and rechecking the context in search of an alternative meaning. Despite 
this extra processing effort, readers do not always understand the intended ironic 




   
Table 3 
An Example of Experimental Text Used in Study II 
 Text type 
Text region Literal Sarcasm Metaphor 
Introduction Paul and Zachary 
work at a circus. 
Tonight’s show is 
sold out. 
Paul and Zachary work 
at a circus. Tonight’s 
show is sold out. 
Paul and Zachary are 
students at the same 
school. Their teacher 
leaves the classroom 




When Paul is on 
stage, the 
audience laughs 
loudly. When Paul 
leaves the stage, 
he gets a standing 
ovation. 
When Paul is on stage, 
the audience looks 
bored and some people 
yawn. When Paul 
leaves the stage, he 
gets a small round of 
applause. 
 
Paul goes in front of 
the class and starts to 
imitate the teacher. 
The whole class 




“What a clown 
you are!” 
“What a clown you 
are!” 











asks Paul if he 
would like to go 
to the movies. 
 
Later Zachary asks 
Paul if he would like to 
go to the movies. 
 
Later, Zachary asks 
Paul if he would like 





Does Paul work at 
the circus as a 
clown? 
Does Paul work at the 
circus as a clown? 
Were Paul and 
Zachary in the city? 
Inference 
question 
Did Zachary think 
that Paul’s show 
was a success?  
Did Zachary think that 
Paul’s show was a 
success?  
Is Paul a professional 
circus clown? 
Note. Translated from Finnish. There were three different versions (literal, 
metaphoric, and sarcastic) of each text; each participant read only one of the 
versions. Text versions were counterbalanced across participants. 
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 Individual differences in both general cognitive factors (WMC) as well as the 
processing of emotional information were related to the processing of irony. High 
WMC was related to an increased probability of rereading ironic sentences when 
compared to the rereading of literal ones towards the end of the experiment, whereas 
low WMC was related to an increased probability of look-back to the ironic (vs. 
literal) sentences; this replicated the findings of Study I. Poor ability to make use of 
emotional information (low IGT scores) was related to an increased probability of 
look-back from the ironic target sentences, whereas high IGT scores were related to 
a decrease in look-back at the parts of the context that made the utterance ironic. 
These findings indicate that the efficiency of making use of emotional information 
is related to the speed with which readers are capable of resolving the ironic meaning, 
and furthermore, poorer ability is related to more effortful processing of the ironic 
utterances. NFC was not related to the processing of irony; this replicated the results 
of Study I. 
 Some of the reading time effects related to the processing of both irony and 
metaphors changed during the experimental session, and these changes were 
modulated by the WMC. First, overall, the probability of initiating a look-back to a 
target utterance decreased towards the end of the experiment; however, low WMC 
readers did not show this change in the probability of look-back to metaphorical 
utterances. Second, high WMC was related to an increased probability of rereading 
ironic statements toward the end of the experiment. The result suggests that exposure 
to the figurative utterances during the course of the experiment formed a global 
context that supported the ironic interpretation and aided the interpretation 
formation. 
 The results of Study II suggest that different forms of figurative language create 
different cognitive demands for the reader. They also suggest that reader 
characteristics play a prominent role in figurative language comprehension. 
Study III 
Olkoniemi, H., Strömberg, V., & Kaakinen, J. K. (2018). The ability to recognise 
emotions predicts the time-course of sarcasm processing: Evidence from eye 
movements. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology. Advance online 
publication. 
 
In verbal irony, there is a discrepancy between the literal meaning of the statement 
and the context in which it is presented. Consequently, an ironic statement introduces 
a break in the local coherence of the text. Previous studies have shown that written 
ironic statements in stories often elicit longer processing times than their literal 
counterparts (e.g., Au-Yeung et al., 2015, Filik & Moxey, 2010; Study I; Study II), 
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presumably reflecting the difficulty of integrating the statement with the context 
(e.g., Grice, 1975). The aim of Study III was to examine whether the observed 
slowdown in the reading of the ironic utterances was related specifically to resolving 
the meaning of irony or whether it merely reflected readers’ efforts to resolve the 
local inconsistency (e.g., McKoon & Ratcliff, 1992). Moreover, it explored how 
individual differences in the ability to recognize emotions and WMC were related to 
this process.  
 In Study III, 60 participants read a total of 60 short paragraphs including sarcastic 
irony and literal statements (20 ironic, 20 literal, and 20 filler items) while their eye 
movements were recorded. In the paragraphs, the location of the local coherence 
break was manipulated by presenting the ironic dialogues either before (context-last 
condition) or after (context-first condition) contextual information. Text paragraphs 
included one or two context sentences and simple dialogues (two lines) between two 
people (see an example in Table 4). In the context-first condition, context sentences 
were presented before the dialogue, resembling previous eye-tracking studies (see 
e.g., Tables 2 and 3). In the context-first condition, irony became evident 
immediately when the reader encountered the target statement. Conversely, in the 
context-last condition, the target statement was presented first and irony became 
evident after the target statement, in the validation statements. It was assumed that if 
the effects observed in previous studies on the processing of verbal irony are related 
to local inconsistency, longer reading times should be observed for ironic rather than 
for literal validation statements in the context-last condition. However, if resolving 
the ironic meaning requires the reprocessing of the ironic statement, readers should 
make more look-backs to the ironic target statement in the context-last condition. 
Paragraphs used in the study were pre-tested for the following: 1) how familiar the 
target statements were as ironic when compared to those with a literal meaning (N = 
25); and 2) how ironic statements were experienced compared with literal statements 
(N = 52). The result of the pre-test showed that the target statements were overall 
more familiar as literal statements than as ironic, and ironic statements were rated as 
being funnier and more insulting when compared to literal ones. Moreover, the 
context manipulation had no effect on how the paragraphs were evaluated or 
comprehended.  
 After a third of the stories, participants responded to a text memory question (e.g., 
“Was Peter’s car new?”) and an inference question (e.g., “In your opinion, what did 
Veikko mean?”) that tapped into the understanding of the meaning of the target 
utterance. The percentage of correct answers was calculated for both text memory 
and inference questions. Individual differences in WMC were measured using the 
reading span task (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980), and the ability to recognize 





 The results showed that readers increased the reprocessing of the statement in 
which the irony became evident (target statement in the context-first condition and 
validation statement in the context-last condition) and returned to the previous text 
part from the statement. However, in the context-last condition, readers also did 
longer look-backs to ironic target utterances. The results suggest that the slowdown 
typically observed with ironic statements in a text is partly related to resolving a 
coherence break, but there also is a component related to resolving the ironic 
meaning. The result supports the idea that resolving the meaning of irony requires 
re-evaluating the meaning of the statement (e.g., Grice, 1975).  
Table 4 
   
Examples of Experimental Paragraphs used in Study III 
Context Region Text type Text 
First Context Literal Veikko takes a closer look at a 
new car that his friend Peter has 
bought. 
 
Sarcastic Veikko takes a closer look at a 
rusty car that his friend Peter has 
bought. 
 
 Target statement 
 
Veikko: “The car looks great!” 
 





Sarcastic Peter: “Well, it’s not in the best 
condition.” 
    
Last Target statement 
 
Veikko: “The car looks great!” 
  
Validation statement Literal Peter: “Wait until you see how it 
drives.” 
   
Sarcastic Peter: “Well, it’s not in the best 
condition.” 
 
Context Literal Veikko takes a closer look at a 
new car that his friend Peter has 
bought. 
 
    Sarcastic Veikko takes a closer look at a 
rusty car that his friend Peter has 
bought. 
Note. Examples are translations from Finnish. There were two different versions 
of each paragraph (literal and sarcastic); each participant read only one of the 
versions, which were counterbalanced across participants.  
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 The results also suggest that forming a correct interpretation of the ironic 
statement is somewhat easier when the context is presented after it, at least for those 
who are poorer at recognizing emotions. In the context-first condition, readers who 
have a relatively poor ability to recognize emotions (i.e., higher scores on the TAS) 
showed increased first-pass reading time on the validation statements in the ironic 
paragraphs. These findings support the hypothesis that poor ability to recognize 
emotions is related to greater confusion when encountering ironic statements, which 
is in line with Study II of this thesis. The result suggests that the intended emotional 
message in irony serves as a cue that points toward the ironic interpretation, helping 
the reader to infer the intended meaning (Pexman, 2008). Those having difficulties 
noticing or interpreting the emotional message delivered by an ironic statement need 
more contextual information to form the correct inference. However, this effect was 
not seen in the context-last condition. It has been suggested that when the context is 
presented first, integrating the meaning of the ironic statement with the context is 
more difficult than when the statement precedes the context (Ackerman, 1982; cf. 
Grice, 1975). When the context precedes the sarcastic statement, readers have 
already started to build a literal text representation in their minds; thus, the reader 
expects a literal statement (e.g., Gibbs, 1994; Giora, 2003). This causes the extra 
processing in the context-first condition for ironic statements. However, when the 
context comes after the statement, there is no text representation that the statement 
should be integrated with, or at least it is not as strong as in the context first condition, 
and the reader is more open to different interpretations. The statement might be a 
literal or ironic comment, which would become evident only later, and there is less 
need for extra processing of the target statement. The results suggest that in the 
context-last condition, readers have not started to build a literal text representation 
before the statement, but rather have started to build an ironic interpretation as early 
as possible (Ackerman, 1982). This seems to especially aid readers who have a 
poorer ability to recognize emotions and, thus, may not be able to recognize the 
emotional cues; they may need to form an inference based on contextual cues 
provided in the text. 
 As for the individual differences related to WMC, Study III failed to replicate the 
findings of Studies I and II. The text materials used in Study III were very short in 
comparison to those used in the previous studies (3–4 sentences; in previous studies 
5–14 sentences were used). It might be the case that shorter paragraphs do not strain 
working memory, which is likely to diminish the effects related to WMC.  
 Finally, it is also worth noting that Study III replicated some of the previous 
findings not directly related to the experimental manipulation. First, some of the 
effects related to the processing of irony changed during the experimental session, 
replicating the findings of Study II (see also Spotorno & Noveck, 2014). It is possible 
that ironic statements encountered during the experiment created a global context in 
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which irony was increasingly more likely to appear, affecting the processing of the 
paragraphs. Moreover, Study III replicated the findings of Studies I and II in showing 
that readers were poorer at responding to the inference questions after ironic 
paragraphs than they were at responding after literal paragraphs. However, in Study 
III, readers were more accurate when answering text-memory questions related to 
ironic texts than they were when answering after literal texts, suggesting that the 
extra effort invested in the processing of irony helps readers to better recall the text 
content. 
Study IV 
Olkoniemi, H., Johander, E., & Kaakinen, J.K. (2018). The role of look-backs in the 
processing of written sarcasm. Memory & Cognition. Advance online publication. 
 
The results of Studies I–III showed that when resolving the meaning of ironic 
utterances in a text, readers often make fixations that return to the ironic utterance 
from subsequent parts of the text (see also e.g., Au-Yeung et al., 2015, Filik et al., 
2014; Filik & Moxey, 2010; Turcan & Filik, 2016). From the theoretical point of 
view, these look-backs may reflect that readers are trying to integrate the ironic 
statement with the developing text representation, which requires a reanalysis of the 
statement (e.g., Grice, 1975). The former studies suggested that the reason for re-
inspections was that readers wanted to refresh the text information in their memory, 
which supports comprehension (e.g., Booth & Weger, 2013; Hyönä et al., 2002; 
Hyönä & Nurminen, 2006; Rayner et al., 2006; Schotter et al., 2014; White et al., 
2016).  
 However, an interesting possibility is that look-back at a text does not necessarily 
indicate a need to re-inspect the information itself, but a need to focus attention on 
what had appeared in that location (Meseguer et al., 2002). Sometimes eye 
movements to already-viewed locations are triggered by the re-activation of a 
memory representation, and this enhances subsequent memory retrieval (Ferreira et 
al., 2008). This view is supported by studies showing that if a relevant visual stimulus 
was presented to a certain location on screen, people sometimes fixated on that 
location even after the stimulus was removed; they looked at nothing (see e.g., 
Ferreira et al., 2008 for review; see also Meseguer et al., 2002). Furthermore, it has 
been shown that if this looking at nothing behavior is restricted, by asking 
participants to maintain central fixation, it disrupts memory retrieval of the visual 
information (e.g., Laeng & Teodorescu, 2002). Therefore, look-backs may support 
the refreshing of text information in memory by either 1) focusing attention on a 
certain spatial location, which aids in retrieving the text contents from memory; 
and/or 2) by providing a review of the text content itself. In Study IV, the availability 
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of the text information during the later look-backs was manipulated to examine the 
role of these look-back fixations in the processing of sarcastic irony. Moreover, it 
explored whether there are individual differences related to WMC and the processing 
of emotional information in how readers resolve irony.  
 In the Study, 62 adult participants read a total of 42 short paragraphs containing 
either a literal or ironic utterance while their eye movements were recorded. The text 
paragraphs used were the same as in Study II. The texts were presented using a 
modified trailing mask paradigm utilized in previous sentence-reading studies 
(Schotter et al., 2014; see also McConkie & Rayner, 1975) to be suitable for passage 
reading. In the masking condition, readers revealed the text (that was initially 
replaced with x’s) one sentence at a time by pressing the spacebar, and the previously 
read sentence was always replaced with x’s as soon as the reader moved to the next 
sentence. This type of masking allowed readers to perform normal first-pass 
rereading of the sentence, but prevented re-examination of the text content during 
later look-backs. In the no-masking condition, readers revealed initially masked text 
one sentence at a time by pressing the spacebar, and the sentences remained visible 
throughout the trial. After reading each story, participants responded to a text 
memory and an inference question. The percentage of correct answers and response 
times were calculated for both text memory and inference questions.  
 Individual differences in WMC were measured using the reading span task 
(verbal working memory; Daneman & Carpenter, 1980) and the symmetry span task 
(spatial working memory; Redick et al., 2012), and the processing of emotional 
information was measured using IGT (Bechara et al., 1994) and TAS (Bagby et al., 
1994; Joukamaa et al., 2001).  
 The results showed that in the masking condition, readers seemed to compensate 
for their inability to retrieve text content by looking back specifically to an ironic 
statement by investing extra effort during first-pass reading. The results also showed 
that the need for re-accessing the ironic statement was mediated by spatial working 
memory. Readers with lower spatial WMC were more likely to re-access the text 
content. Readers with lower spatial WMC showed increased look-back to ironic 
target sentences in the no-masking condition, but longer first-pass rereading in the 
masking condition. On the other hand, the processing of ironic target sentences 
remained relatively similar across masking and no-masking conditions for readers 
with high spatial WMC. However, readers with high spatial WMC did more look-
backs to ironic target sentences in the masking condition than they did to literal target 
sentences. The result suggests that readers with high spatial WMC seem to be able 
to use look-backs to the utterance location as a cue about the text content. These 
findings are in line with the Compensatory-Encoding Model (Walczyk & Taylor, 
1996) that states that readers with low WMC use text as external memory and utilize 
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compensatory strategies by initiating look-backs or slowing down their reading, for 
example. 
 Overall, the results suggest that, although look-backs provide an opportunity to 
re-examine the text contents when resolving irony, they are not necessary for 
successful comprehension of irony. Because readers were able to change their 
reading behavior in response to the text mask manipulation, the results suggest that 
readers are already aware of the ironic nature of an utterance during first-pass 
reading. However, it seems that re-inspecting the ironic utterance either during first-
pass reading or during look-backs is important for the formation of the ironic 
interpretation. Moreover, an additional analysis, carried out in response to a 
suggestion by one of the reviewers, showed that look-backs initiated from the ironic 
target statement were related to poorer irony comprehension. The result seems to 
suggest that the need for a reader to return to previous parts of the text after reading 
the ironic statement reflects confusion about the possible interpretation of the 
utterance. Thus, not all of the rereading seems to support the comprehension of irony. 
The result is in line with the suggestion of Gibbs and Colston (2012) that a failure to 
integrate the utterance with the context is one of the reasons why a reader might not 
understand a sarcastic comment. 
 In line with Studies II and III, the results showed that the ability to recognize 
emotions was related to the efficiency of resolving irony. Readers who were better 
able to recognize emotions invested less processing effort to form an ironic 
interpretation, suggesting that readers who are better able to recognize the intended 
emotional message in irony are faster to categorize the utterance as ironic.  
 Finally, the results demonstrated that ironic utterances received longer look-backs 
from the spillover region in the beginning of the experiment, implying increased 
sentence wrap-up processing (e.g., Rayner, Kambe, & Duffy, 2000). Moreover, 
readers showed slower responses to inference questions after ironic versus literal 
texts; however, this effect wore off towards the end of the experiment. The results 
partly replicate the findings of Studies II and III, showing that some effects related 
to the processing of ironic utterances changed during the course of experiment. This 
suggests that after encountering several paragraphs containing irony during the 
course of the experiment, readers form an expectation for irony, which facilitates the 




The purpose of the present thesis was to explore 1) how readers resolve the meaning 
of written irony; 2) what are the individual differences in the processing of written 
irony; and 3) how the processing of irony compares to the other forms of non-literal 
language, namely, metaphors. Next, I will discuss the findings of the studies, the 
theoretical implications, the limitations of the studies, and suggestions for future 
directions of research on irony.  
3.1. How Readers Resolve the Meaning of Written 
Irony 
The results of the studies showed that when the context does not signify forthcoming 
irony and the ironic utterance itself is not conventional, the processing of written 
irony takes more time to process and is harder to comprehend than its literal 
counterparts (Gibbs, 1994a; Giora, 2003; Grice, 1975; Pexman, 2008). Across the 
studies, verbal irony produced mainly delayed effects in the eye-movement records 
of readers typically showing an increased number of look-backs to ironic target 
utterances (Studies I-IV) and an increased number of look-backs from the ironic 
utterance to the prior context (Studies II-IV). These findings are in line with previous 
eye-tracking studies that have shown increased total reading times4 for ironic 
utterances in comparison to literal target ones (e.g., Au-Yeung et al., 2015; Filik et 
al., 2014; Filik & Moxey, 2010; Turcan & Filik, 2016) and longer total reading times 
for the context sentences of the ironic texts (Filik & Moxey, 2010). It has been 
suggested that longer look-backs at the text would reflect an effort to build a 
comprehensive mental representation of the main textual contents (Hyönä et al., 
2002). Readers have been shown to be aware of their look-backs, suggesting that it 
is a form of strategic reading behavior (Hyönä & Nurminen, 2006). Based on the 
theoretical views on verbal irony, it may be claimed that the look-back behavior 
                                                     
4  Total reading time is a summed duration of all fixations landing on a text region. 
Although it contains both first-pass and second-pass fixations, it is generally taken as 
an indication of relatively late processing (Liversedge et al., 1998; Rayner, 1998; 2009). 
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reflects the integration of the utterance meaning with the context (see e.g., Gibbs & 
Colston, 2012, for a review).  
 However, the results of Study III indicate that the slowdown related to the 
processing of the ironic utterances is only partially due to irony itself. The results 
suggest that, at least to some extent, the extra processing is related to the local 
inconsistency formed by the ironic utterance, and may reflect a reader’s confusion 
when s/he encounters a coherence break in the text. Moreover, the results of Study 
IV indicate that look-backs might not be necessary for successful irony 
comprehension; during the first-pass reading of the ironic target utterance, readers 
were at least already aware that the target statement did not fit in the context. Thus, 
readers are already able to start processing the new ironic meaning (vs. the literal 
meaning) of the utterance during the first-pass reading, when they are forced to do 
so, for example, by preventing later rereading by masking, as in Study IV. However, 
the results suggest that to understand the ironic meaning, some kind of reprocessing 
is needed. Furthermore, additional analysis showed that an increased number of 
look-backs initiated from the ironic statement is associated with poorer irony 
comprehension. Thus, these look-backs probably reflect the confusion of the reader 
when the ironic utterance does not fit in the previously read context and the reader 
is not able to form a suitable interpretation for the utterance.  
 Across the studies for the present thesis, the results also showed increased first-
pass rereading times for ironic target utterances. However, first-pass rereading was 
always related to individual difference measures, typically to WMC (Studies I, II, 
and IV). Moreover, the findings of Study IV indicate that readers with higher spatial 
WMC might not need look-back to the ironic target utterance to revisit the textual 
information, as the others do. Individual differences will be discussed in more detail 
in the next chapter. 
 The results of Studies II–IV also (interestingly) demonstrated that some of the 
effects related to the processing of verbal irony changed during the experimental 
session (see also Spotorno & Noveck, 2014). The results suggest that participants 
had become sensitive to irony during the experiment, and that the observed effects 
may depend on the amount of prior exposure to irony. It is possible that the observed 
order effects are similar to syntactic priming effects. In syntactic priming, the 
presentation of a syntactic structure facilitates the comprehension of subsequent 
similar structures (see e.g., Traxler, Tooley, & Pickering, 2014). It is also possible 
that the ironic utterances encountered during the experiment create a global context 
emerging from the different stories that supports the ironic interpretation.  
 The results showed that ironic utterances were harder to comprehend than their 
literal counterparts, as reflected by lower accuracy scores for the inference questions 
asked after the texts had been read (Studies I–IV). It seems that despite the extra 
effort invested in the processing of irony, readers do not always understand the true 
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meaning of irony. They also took longer to respond to the inference questions after 
ironic texts than they did to those following the literal texts (Study IV). The result 
may indicate that readers need more time to validate their answer after ironic texts. 
3.2. Individual Differences in Processing Written Irony 
3.2.1. Working memory capacity 
The results of the studies of this thesis demonstrated that there are individual 
differences in the processing of verbal irony related to WMC. Higher verbal WMC 
was already related to an increase in the processing times of the ironic target 
statements during the first-pass reading (Studies I, and II). These findings are in line 
with a suggestion by Giora (1999) that readers with higher WMC would be better at 
suppressing the salient literal meaning, and thus can already start processing the 
intended meaning during the first-pass reading of the utterance. However, the results 
of Study III showed that when the ironic utterances were embedded in relatively 
short (3–4 sentences long) paragraphs, this effect was not found. The pattern of 
results obtained in Studies I–III suggests that readers might have to inhibit not only 
the more salient literal meaning, but also the irrelevant text context that is not critical 
for the interpretation of the ironic utterance. In other words, it seems that when there 
is a minimal amount of or no irrelevant context (only 1–2 sentences) that needs to be 
inhibited during the interpretation formation, individual differences related to WMC 
disappear.  
 Furthermore, the results indicate that readers with lower WMC need to rely more 
on external memory – the text itself. As shown in Study II, readers with low WMC 
were more likely to look back to ironic target utterances from the other parts of the 
text. In addition, the results of Study IV showed that readers with lower (spatial) 
WMC needed to compensate when they were not able to retrieve textual information 
during the second-pass reading (i.e., by looking back at text) due to masking, and 
they slowed down during the first-pass reading. The results are in line with the 
Compensatory-Encoding Model (e.g., Walczyk & Taylor, 1996). The model 
suggests that readers with low WMC are bound to use text as external memory and 
apply compensatory strategies, such as looking back or slowing down their reading.  
 Finally (and surprisingly), the results of Study IV showed that readers with high 
spatial WMC also made look-backs to the ironic target utterances when the ability 
to retrieve textual information by looking back was restricted by visual masking. As 
suggested by the former research literature, readers build a spatial representation of 
the text layout while reading (Baccino & Pynte, 1994; 1998; Kennedy et al., 2003; 
Murray & Kennedy, 1988), which aids readers to direct regressive eye movements, 
such as look-backs, accurately towards an intended text location (Kennedy et al., 
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2003). Moreover, it has been suggested that returns in text would reflect a need to 
focus attention on what had appeared there (Meseguer et al., 2002), and that the re-
activation of the memory representation sometimes drives the eyes to already-
viewed locations (Ferreira et al., 2008). Thus, it seems that for readers with higher 
spatial working memory, look-backs work as cues about the text content: They made 
look-backs to the ironic statement even when it was masked. In other words, it is 
possible that they are better at maintaining in their mind an episodic memory 
representation that contains both the text content and the spatial information. Thus, 
look-backs to previous parts of the text help them to retrieve the content information 
from memory. 
3.2.2. The ability to process emotional information 
Pre-tests for Studies II and III showed that there is an emotional component in the 
verbal irony. Irony (at least the sarcastic irony that was used in these experiments) is 
experienced as negative/as an insult (Study II and III), but also as funny (Study III), 
which is in line with previous studies (Akimoto et al, 2014; Bowes & Katz, 2011; 
Dews et al., 1995; Gibbs & Izett, 2005; Jorgensen, 1996; Kreuz et al., 1991; Leggitt 
& Gibbs, 2000; Winner & Leekam, 1991). Therefore, it is not surprising that the 
results of these studies showed that the ability to process emotional information is 
related to the processing of written irony (Studies II–IV).  
 The results showed that a better ability to process emotional information is related 
to less processing time invested in the ironic target statements (Studies II; IV). 
Moreover, those with a poorer ability to process emotional information showed 
increased processing times for the paragraphs containing an ironic utterance. These 
results are in line with the constraint satisfaction framework (Pexman, 2008) in 
suggesting that the emotional message delivered by the ironic statement works as a 
supporting cue for ironic interpretation. Consequently, readers with a better ability 
to process emotional information are faster at processing ironic meanings. On the 
other hand, it seems that those with a poorer ability to process emotional information 
need to have their interpretation rely more on the textual context, as suggested by the 
increased processing of contextual information in textual paragraphs containing an 
ironic utterance. 
 It should be noted that the effects related to the processing of emotional 
information were relatively small across the studies for this thesis. However, the 
effects were found consistently across the studies, suggesting that the ability to 




3.3. Differences in Comprehending Irony versus 
Metaphors 
The results of Study II showed that the processing of irony differs from the 
processing of metaphors: The processing of metaphors was characterized by 
slowdown during first-pass reading of the utterances, whereas irony produced mainly 
delayed effects in the eye-movement records. Ironic statements were also harder to 
comprehend than literal or metaphorical utterances, as indicated by the poorer 
performance on responses to inference questions. As noted in the introduction, the 
comprehension of metaphors requires the reader to find commonalities between the 
topic and the vehicle from his/her memory, whereas irony comprehension requires 
the reader to integrate the utterance meaning with the context where it appears (see 
e.g., Colston & Gibbs, 2002; Pexman et al., 2000; Winner & Gardner, 1993).  
 As for the individual differences, WMC affected the processing of both irony and 
metaphors: low WMC was related to an increase in look-back to the metaphorical 
and ironic statements. The results indicate that integrating the utterance meaning 
with the context (i.e., comprehension of irony) and finding commonalities with two 
or more concepts (i.e., comprehension of metaphors) requires from the reader an 
ability to manipulate information in his/her mind to achieve a correct interpretation 
(i.e., working memory). However, the ability to process emotional information was 
only related to the processing of irony and not to that of metaphors, suggesting that 
the emotional component in verbal irony (non-existent in metaphors) makes irony 
different from literal or metaphoric language. 
3.4. Theoretical Implications 
In general, the findings of the studies for the present thesis are in line with most 
current theories on irony comprehension. The theories state that ironic utterances are 
harder to process and comprehend than their literal counterparts, when the context 
does not provide advance cues for an ironic interpretation (Gibbs, 1994; Pexman, 
2008) and when the utterance is not typically used as ironic (Giora, 2003; Grice, 
1975). Under these conditions, readers are likely to adopt a literal meaning; so, in 
order to comprehend the utterance correctly, they need to reassess its meaning 
(Giora, 2003; Grice, 1975). However, the current theoretical views do not make 
precise enough predictions on how different factors affect the processing of written 
irony and how individual differences affect the processing of written irony. Based 
on the current theoretical evidence, and mostly on a parallel constraint satisfaction 
framework (Pexman, 2008), the empirical evidence on irony comprehension, and the 
findings of the studies for the present thesis, I suggest a new model: the Cumulative 





Figure 1. The Cumulative Evidence Model of irony comprehension. 
 
 The core idea of the model is that because the very nature of irony lies in the 
contrast between the literal form of the ironic utterance and the context in which it 
is presented, the ironic utterance is typically not expected. Hence, it needs more time 
to process. The results of the studies for this thesis have shown that the extra 
processing time needed in resolving the intended meaning is seen as a reprocessing 
of the ironic target utterance itself. This is seen in the rereading measures (i.e., first-
pass rereadings, look-backs, and look-froms). However, cumulative evidence for the 
ironic interpretation can reduce ambiguity or the level of surprise related to the ironic 
utterance, which results in less reprocessing of the ironic utterance. In an extreme 
case, irony is expected and does not need any extra processing in comparison to its 
literal counterpart. On the other end of the continuum, if there is not enough evidence 
for ironic interpretation, the utterance is misunderstood (see also Kruger, Espley, 
Parker, & Ng, 2005). In the model, I make the assumption that the context in which 
the ironic utterance appears, the utterance itself, and the reader-related factors 
contribute to the evidence all accumulating toward an ironic interpretation and thus 
affect the ease of interpreting the intended meaning of the utterance.  
 Context effects are divided into local and global. By local context, I mean, for 
example, the textual context given before the target utterance. The evidence given in 
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the local context can reduce the amount of ambiguity of the ironic utterance (see also 
Pexman, 2008). An extreme example of this would be a statement prior to the ironic 
statement explaining that what the protagonist says next is going to be ironic. I 
believe that in this kind of extreme setting, the processing time for the ironic 
utterance would be the same as for its literal equivalent. Moreover, the ease with 
which the critical cues for the ironic interpretation can be accessed should make the 
comprehension of the ironic meaning easier and, consequently, faster. For example, 
the relative closeness of the critical cues to the ironic utterance (Ackerman, 1982) 
and the quantity of other text not specifically related to the ironic interpretation are 
assumed to influence the interpretation formation (see e.g., Study III).  
 Global context, on the other hand, refers to the wider context in which the local 
context and the ironic utterance appear. For example, the previously read texts can 
form the global context. If the reader repeatedly encounters ironic utterances in the 
same situation (i.e., within the same experiment), there will be an expectation of 
forthcoming irony, which, in turn, reduces the level of confusion potentially caused 
by irony. This could be seen as reducing the time the reader needs to arrive at an 
ironic interpretation compared to the first encounters of the ironic utterances in the 
same situation.  
 As for the utterance-related factors, at the very least, the emotional valence of an 
ironic utterance (Pexman, 2008), the intensity of an emotional component (Jacob et 
al., 2016), and the familiarity of an utterance (e.g., Giora, 2003) should work as 
evidence pointing towards an ironic interpretation and reduce the time needed to 
achieve the ironic meaning. For example, the study by Filik and colleagues (2016) 
showed that when an ambiguous sarcastic comment was accompanied by a wink 
emoticon ;), it reinforced the intended sarcastic meaning5 (see also Derks, Bos, & 
von Grumbkow, 2008). Moreover, there is lots of evidence on how word frequency 
(i.e., the familiarity of a word), reduces the amount of time spent on reading a single 
word (Rayner, 1998; 2009). Similarly, the more frequently a single utterance appears 
in the environment as ironic, the faster the reader categorizes the utterance as ironic 
(see also Giora, 2003). A recent eye-tracking study has also shown that the 
familiarity of an ironic utterance reduces the amount of time spent to process it (Filik 
et al., 2014; Turcan & Filik, 2016).  
 Reader-related factors exert an effect on how the reader processes contextual and 
utterance-related cues and thus on a reader’s ability to make a correct inference. 
Working memory is related to a reader’s ability to deal with contextual information. 
High WMC readers are able to inhibit the irrelevant contextual information, activate 
relevant cues, and start processing the ironic meaning as soon as they encounter an 
                                                     
5  It should be noted that whether emoticons serve as representations of a writer’s 
emotions or only as pragmatic markers to clarify an intended meaning is a controversial 
issue (Skovholt, Grønning, & Kankaanranta, 2014; Thompson & Filik, 2016). 
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ironic utterance. I believe that the better an individual is in inhibiting irrelevant 
information, the more efficient s/he is in achieving an ironic interpretation. However, 
based on the former studies (e.g., Dews et al., 1995) and the results of this thesis I 
would make a claim that for successful interpretation it is not necessary to 
completely inhibit other interpretations. Emotional processing abilities are related to 
a reader’s ability to recognize the intended emotional message, which works as an 
additional cue pointing towards an ironic interpretation (see also Pexman, 2008). I 
assume that a reader’s world knowledge affects the processing of ironic utterances 
by aiding the reader to recognize, for example, typical situations where irony appears 
(global context) and typical ironic remarks uttered in certain situations (familiarity), 
such as typical ironic lines appearing in some TV sitcoms.  
 The contextual factors, qualities of an utterance, and the reader-related factors 
together affect how much evidence the reader can accumulate toward an ironic 
interpretation. If there is enough evidence pointing toward an ironic interpretation, 
the correct interpretation is achieved. On the other hand, if there is insufficient 
evidence, the formation of the correct interpretation fails. Yet, if there is some, but 
not enough evidence, the reader might stay in the cat state. I have borrowed the 
concept of cat state used in quantum mechanics to describe quantum superposition 
to serve as an analogy for use with understanding irony comprehension when a 
reader can produce possible interpretation options, but cannot decide which one is 
the correct one. The cat state typically refers to Schrödinger’s Cat Paradox, in which 
(to simplify the thought experiment) a cat is put in a metal chamber with poison that 
might or might not kill it (Trimmer, 1980). When the chamber remains closed the 
cat is considered to be simultaneously dead and alive (superposition), but opening 
the chamber and observing the cat will tip the scale to one of the outcomes (Yam, 
2012). Similarly, a reader of ironic statements who is given some evidence so that it 
is possible to produce an ironic interpretation option, but is not given enough 
evidence so that s/he can be confident about the interpretation, remains in a state in 
which both interpretation options seem to be likely interpretations. There could be 
other options as well, if the evidence in the text supports other possible 
interpretations (e.g., lies). However, when the reader is forced to decide, one of the 
interpretation options is chosen. This could explain why in Study IV longer response 
times were observed for the inference questions posed after ironic texts were read. 
There is also some evidence pointing out that literal and ironic interpretations can 
co-exist, at least in some form (e.g., Dews et al., 1995; Filik, Brightman, Gathercole, 





3.5. Critical Remarks 
The studies of this thesis, naturally, had their limitations. First, sarcastic irony was 
used across the studies (Study I, Exp2; Study II–IV). Sarcasm is a specific subtype 
of verbal irony. In sarcastic irony, the emotional marker is clearer than in other types 
of irony because sarcasm is typically meant to criticize someone (e.g., Attardo, 
2000). Thus, these results might not generalize to all types of irony, and future 
studies are needed to explore, for example, the relation between the ability to process 
emotional information and the ability to process different forms of verbal irony. 
 Second, two different tasks were used to measure the processing of emotional 
information. IGT (Bechara et al., 1994) was used in Studies II and IV, and the TAS 
(Bagby et al., 1994; Joukamaa et al., 2001) was used in Studies III and IV. Both 
measures demonstrated relatively similar effects in the processing of sarcastic irony, 
although they should measure different abilities. IGT is thought to measure an 
individual’s sensitivity to emotional responses to reward and/or punishment in a 
decision-making task. The effect of the emotional response measured by IGT is 
thought to be, to some extent, unconscious (e.g., Buelow & Suhr, 2009). On the other 
hand, TAS measures an individual’s ability to recognize and name emotions (i.e., 
alexithymic traits) and should reflect a more conscious emotional processing ability. 
In Study IV, both measures were used, and the results showed that only TAS was 
related to the processing of irony. The results also showed that the task scores did 
not correlate with each other (r = -0.06), suggesting that they indeed measure 
different abilities. The result suggests that the ability to name and recognize emotions 
might be a stronger predictor of irony comprehension than the automatic activation 
of emotion. However, this suggestion should be considered with some caution, as 
the experimental manipulation (masking) used in Study IV might have affected the 
observed effects. Thus, the nature of individual differences related to the processing 
of emotional information should be explored in more detail in the future. 
 Third, the gender distribution was skewed across the studies of this thesis. This 
possible limitation was pointed out by one of the reviewers of Study IV. Previous 
studies have shown that men are more likely to use ironic language than women 
(Colston & Lee, 2004; Gibbs, 2000; Rockwell & Theriot, 2001; cf. Taylor, 2017). 
However, only a few studies have examined gender differences in the 
comprehension of irony (Baptista, Macedo & Boggio, 2015; Holtgraves, 1997; 
Rothermich & Pell, 2015), and most of them have not found differences between 
males and females in irony comprehension (Baptista et al., 2015; indirect language 
in general, Holtgraves, 1997). However, some findings have shown that the 
processing strategy used for understanding irony differs between men and women 
(Baptista et al., 2015). Moreover, results of the study by Rothermich and Pell (2015) 
showed that women were better at recognizing sarcasm than men. Thus, the potential 
gender effects should be taken into account in the future. 
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3.6. Future Directions 
The studies for the present thesis raise some interesting questions to be explored in 
the future. First, the purpose of the present thesis was to explore individual 
differences in the processing of written irony related to WMC and emotional abilities 
among healthy adults. The studies for this thesis were the very first to explore the 
matter, and the results related to the individual differences were exploratory by 
nature. Thus, in the future, it would be interesting to experimentally manipulate the 
working memory load and emotional state of readers to further explore the role that 
WMC and emotional abilities play in irony comprehension. 
 The results of this thesis have showed for that a global context can also affect the 
processing of ironic statements. In the future, it would be important to explore the 
role of the global context by manipulating it more directly; for example, by 
investigating whether prior exposure to ironic materials or conversations before the 
actual experiment is enough to create an expectation about forthcoming irony in the 
experiment and thus facilitate irony processing. Moreover, there are already some 
studies that have explored the role of the local context in the processing of verbal 
irony (e.g., Pexman et al., 2000; Turcan & Filik, 2016). However, we still do not 
know how cumulative evidence about forthcoming irony affects reading times. As 
predicted by the CEM, the clearer the evidence about forthcoming irony in local 
context is, the shorter the reading times for ironic statements should be in comparison 
to those for literal statements. It would be interesting to directly explore this by, for 
example, examining reading time differences between different strengths of cues 
(e.g., by comparing an explicit mention of the target statement as ironic to more 
subtle cues).  
 Finally, in the present studies, ironic text materials were used that were written 
by me with the help of my co-authors and colleagues. These materials were 
controlled for many features; for example, the same target sentence was used as 
ironic and literal. The advantage of using controlled text materials is that comparable 
reading times can be obtained for ironic and literal statements when presented out of 
context (see discussion between Gibbs, 1986, and Giora, 1995). In other words, 
possible differences in reading times can be ascribed to irony comprehension. 
However, irony research has been criticized for using artificial settings while 
studying such diverse social phenomena (see e.g., Katz, 2005). The eye-tracking 
methodology used in the present thesis would also enable the study of verbal irony 
processing in more naturalistic settings, for example, by using video clips containing 
real discourse, or by using written ironic statements published on social media sites. 
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